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DE PAUL: LAW REVIEW
'CONTRACTS-PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL HELD iNSUFFICIENT
TO MAKE AN OFFER IRREVOCABLE
Defendant had signed a document with his tenant, the plaintiff in this action,
whereby it was agreed that for the sum of one dollar, defendant would give the
plaintiff the right to renew his lease, in the event that he, the plaintiff, would
secure a bona fide and approved sublease. The dollar was never paid. About
four months later, the plaintiff entered into several binding subleases, none of
which were ever submitted for approval to the defendant. Subsequently, the
defendant notified the plaintiff that he did not intend to renew the leases which
were to expire shortly. The plaintiff thereafter attempted to exercise his rights
under the option agreement, the end result being that the defendant evicted the
plaintiff at the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff in this action sued for dam-
ages caused by the eviction. In holding for the defendant Chief Justice Vander-
bilt speaking for the Supreme Court of New Jersey said that the consideration
of one dollar did not make the offer irrevocable, because it was neither paid nor
was it the consideration bargained for. Nor, as was contended by the plaintiff,
did the plaintiff's reliance in securing subtenants serve to make the offer ir-
revocable, because the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen such re-
liance without the plaintiff first having secured the defendant's approval. Thus,
the court found that the agreement to renew was simply a revocable offer,
which in fact was revoked before any valid acceptance was attempted. Ameri-
can Handkerchief v. Frannat, 109 A. 2d 793 (N.J., 1955).
This case is noteworthy in that the court in disposing of the plaintiff's first
contention asserted the bargain element as being necessary. to have sufficient
consideration to support an offer, and at the same time entertained the doctrine
of reliance in disposing of the plaintiff's second contention. Chief Justice
Vanderbilt, in deciding against the plaintiff on the issue of whether the dollar
was sufficient consideration, cited Williston and several cases2 in which it was
held that in order to have a binding consideration it is absolutely necessary that
the consideration must have in fact been bargained for, even in the face of a
written agreement in which such consideration is recited.
Going to the second contention of whether plaintiff's reliance in securing
subtenants was sufficient to make the offer irrevocable, Chief Justice Vander-
bilt in going against the plaintiff cited Corbin's work in which it is contended
that substantial reliance on the faith of an offer which could have been reason-
ably foreseen by the offeror will serve to make that offer irrevocable.' Thus,
this case illustrates the peculiar phenomena that seems to prevail among the
1 Williston, Contracts § 115 (rev. ed., 1936).
2 Robertson v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 643 (D.C.N.Y., 1920); Finegan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 300 Mass. 147, 14 N.E. 2d 172 (1938); Kay v. Spencer,29 Wyo. 382, 213 Pac. 571
(1923).
1 1 Corbin, Contracts § 51 (1950).
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jurisdictions that have: entertained or applied the doctrine of reliance, more
commonly called promissory estoppel, namely, that the court will consider tWo
doctrines that would seem to be contradictory and apply one of them without
rejecting the other.
Before this case New Jersey adhered rather strictly to the rule of bargain and
consideration, the question of reliance or promissory estoppel as being suf-
ficient to support liability on a promise, seldom, if ever, having arisen. Now,
by reasserting the requirement of bargain, and at the same time entertaining
the idea that reliance might make an offer or promise binding, New Jersey
seems to have joined the groups of states that demand the bargain element as a
necessity of consideration, and at the same time admit in a rather faint voice the
possibility that reliance may make a promise binding. After reading this case,
one wonders if, had the facts been sufficient, the court would have applied the
doctrine of reliance to find a verdict for the plaintiff. Be that as it may, while
this case cannot be cited as an express acceptance of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, it can be considered as representing a willingness of the courts to en-
tertain the doctrine, and perhaps be looked on as a small crack in the iron-clad
doctrine of consideration in New Jersey.
Heretofore, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has usually been asserted in
cases involving absolute promises of one sort or another; seldom has the doc-
trine been called up in cases where an offer is being sought to be enforced as
irrevocable. Accepting for the moment the doctrine of promissory estoppel, can
the doctrine be used to support an offer? It is on such a question as this that it
becomes important to ascertain just what promissory estoppel is. Shall we ac-
cept reasonably foreseeable reliance as consideration itself or as a substitute for
consideration so as to make it a paid-for offer and therefore irrevocable, 4 or
shall we make the offer irrevocable by ignoring the idea of consideration en-
tirely, and substituting Corbin's doctrine of reliance? The authorities are not at
all in agreement on just where promissory estoppel fits into the law. Some say
that it is consideration,5 or a substitute for consideration., Some have looked
upon it as a clear-cut exception to the requirement of consideration. 7 The
author cited by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in the principal case seems to make it a
facet of his all-embracing doctrine of reliance; I others say that the doctrine
logically and historically is a tort rule and does not fit into the law of contracts
at all.' Although there is no uniformity among the authorities as to the nature of
4 Rest., Contracts § 46 (1933).
5Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173
(1927).
6 Porter v. Commissioner, 60 F. 2d 673 (C.A. 2d, 1932).
7 Rest., Contracts §§ 85, 90 (1933).
8 1 Corbin, Contracts §§ 193-208 (1950).
9 Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 28 (1949).
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promissory estoppel, there seems to be agreement as to the requirements neces-
sary to establish it:
1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to produce action or for-
bearance of a definite and substantial character.
2) Actual action or forbearance is induced.
3) Injustice can only be avoided by enforcement.'0
The objection has been raised that promissory estoppel requires a promise
and that in cases like the principal one, it is an offer that is sought to be en-
forced, and for that reason promissory estoppel should not apply. In Bard v.
Kent," a case that is very much like the present one, it was on such reasoning
that the court refused to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel to an offer so
as to make it irrevocable. Such logic seems to display a lack of understanding of
what an offer is. After all, is not an offer simply a conditional promise?12
Should the fact that a promise is conditional instead of absolute bar promissory
estoppel from operating upon it? Nevertheless, it was the distinction between
an offer and a promise, that the court used in the Bard case as its reason for
barring promissory estoppel from making an offer irrevocable.
Judging from the amount of material that has been written on the subject and
the number of cases that have used or considered the doctrine, it seems that
promissory estoppel has a place somewhere in American law. The great im-
pediment, however, to being able to say that the doctrine is a definite part of
our law is the inconsistency with which the courts have applied it. The doctrine
first seems to have emerged in situations where there has been a promise to
abandon an existing right."8 Subsequently, it has been extended to representa-
tions of future conduct in certain classes of cases, the great majority of which
involved the enforcement of charitable subscriptions.)' There has been a general
reluctance to extend the doctrine to commercial contracts; yet there are a few
cases where it has been done."5
It is easy to see the violence that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does to
the rule of consideration, and perhaps because of fear of eventually having
promissory estoppel supplant the doctrine of consideration, the courts are re-
luctant to apply it generally, and use it only as a sort of auxiliary rule to miti-
gate the harshness of the requirement of consideration in certain isolated or
extreme cases where they feel justice will be better served by not demanding
consideration. If the doctrine were to be generally applied, it would certainly
10 Rest., Contracts § 90 (1933).
11 19 Cal. App. 2d 500, 65 P. 2d 955 (1937).
12 Rest., Contracts § 24 (1933).
'1 Hatten v. Vose, 156 F. 2d 464 (C.A. 10th, 1946); Hood v. Polish Nat'l Alliance, 246
Ill. App. 137 (1927).
14 Danby v. Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n, 104 A. 2d 903 (Del. S. Ct., 1954).
15 Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F. 2d 684 (App. D.C., 1948).
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establish liability on promises 6 to be based on three rules that are controlled
by such words as substantial, forseeable, reasonable, actual, and injustice. Corbin
presents a good argument in stating that the courts are already familiar with
such terms and their application. 7 Nevertheless, it is understandable that they
should be somewhat jealous of a rule that is relatively simple to apply, and
which works justice in the majority of cases.
As yet, the Illinois courts have not been called upon to apply the doctrine of
promissory estoppel to a commercial case.
To conclude, it is probably a fair appraisal of this case to say the New Jersey
court has taken a step toward joining the many states that while adhering to the
doctrine of consideration pay some recognition to the doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
16 1 Williston, Contracts § 139 (rev. ed., 1936).
17 1 Corbin, Contracts § 200 (1950).
CRIMINAL LAW-JURORS READING NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT
OF PRIOR ACTS OF DEFENDANT HELD ERROR
The defendant was convicted of rape and given a life sentence. Sixteen years
later, under the subsequently passed Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,' the
defendant filed a petition for relief alleging a substantial denial of his constitu-
tional rights. The Criminal Court of Cook County granted a new trial, holding
that because the jury had been allowed to read prejudicial newspaper articles
concerning the defendant during the trial, his right to a fair and impartial trial
was impaired. It was alleged and not denied that the prosecuting attorney re-
leased the story. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, three justices dissenting,
holding that where all of the jurors were allowed to read, on the evening before
they were to render their verdict, that the defendant had confessed to two
murders, had boasted of attacking more than fifty women, had been referred to
by the police as a "vicious degenerate" and had been arrested while attempting
to attack another woman, it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny
the defendant's motion to withdraw a juror. The court so held notwithstanding
the jurors' affirmances that they could and would disregard what they had read
and notwithstanding the court's instructions to that effect. People v. Hryciuk,
5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E. 2d 61 (1954).
The majority of decisions support the view that a mistrial is warranted only if
the reading of the prejudicial matter appears to actually have the effect of influ-
encing a juror's decision, and this determination is vested with the trial court.'
The effect of reading a prejudicial article may be mitigated by showing that the
1I11. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 38, §§ 826-832.
'People v. Herbert, 340 II1. 320, 172 N.E. 740 (1930); Collins v. Dunbar, 131 Me. 337,
162 At. 897 (1932).
